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Knowledge externalitiesIf localization economies are present, firms within denser industry concentrations should exhibit higher
levels of performance than more isolated firms. Nevertheless, research in industrial organization that has fo-
cused on the influences on firm survival has largely ignored the potential effects from agglomeration. Recent
studies in urban and regional economics suggest that agglomeration effects may be very localized. Analyses
of industry concentration at the MSA or county-level may fail to detect important elements of intra-industry
firm interaction that occur at the sub-MSA level. Using a highly detailed dataset on firm locations and char-
acteristics for Texas, this paper analyses agglomeration effects on firm survival over geographic areas as small
as a single mile radius. We find that greater firm density within very close proximity (within 1 mile) of firms
in the same industry increases mortality rates while greater concentration over larger distances reduces mor-
tality rates.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Marshall hypothesized nearly a century ago that knowledge spill-
overs and shared human capital are localized and help to explain why
certain industries that are not otherwise tied to geographically specif-
ic inputs or demand tend to concentrate spatially. Geographic prox-
imity of kindred firms should foster human interaction, inter-firm
labor mobility, and the exchange of knowledge. As an industrial con-
centration grows and the localized knowledge base expands, the em-
bedded firms enjoy aggregate economies of scale which, in turn,
should contribute to relatively higher growth rates of the geographi-
cally concentrated industry.
If these localization economies bestow advantages on firms in spa-
tially concentrated industries, one would naturally expect that en-
trants would have a preference toward spatial proximity to like
establishments. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find evidence that lo-
calization influences entrants' location decisions although the effect
diminishes rapidly over space. One would not only expect to see a rel-
atively higher rate of entry, however. The cost advantage derived
from localization economies should lead to higher industry perfor-
mance and lower hazard rates, ceteris paribus, for kindred firms with-
in the spatial concentration. Indeed, Henderson (2003) finds that
industrial localization at the county-level has strong productivity ef-
fects in the high tech industries.ilva).
rights reserved.The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of spatial con-
centration on the probability of establishment survival for a set of
high technology industries in Texas. These relatively new industries
have exhibited a strong tendency to cluster. Using a highly detailed
establishment-level data set for Texas, we are able to observe key
establishment-level characteristics, including NAICS-6 industry clas-
sification, size, ownership status, entry and exit dates (in case of
mortality), and exact address. We then utilize, inter alia, exact
establishment-level variations in intra-industry spatial concentra-
tion within concentric rings to test the proposition that industrial
localization influences the likelihood of establishment exit. This
has the advantage of enabling us to observe exact measures of spa-
tial concentration over precise distances independently of arbi-
trary jurisdictional boundaries. Unlike previous industry studies
in this realm, we eliminate the own-establishment contribution
to the concentration measures to correctly identify the potential
for localization effects. We find evidence that greater localization
within very small geographic areas contributes to establishment
mortality while localization effects over a larger geographic area
reduce establishment mortality.
It is surprising that the literature on failure rates has paid relatively
scant attention to the effect of agglomeration economies on survival
and exit rates for industries that tend to specialize geographically. This
is particularly so since there has been an emphasis in this literature on
the role of internal economies of scale in establishment survival and
growth. Due to data limitations, much of the earlier analyses utilized in-
dustry exit rates, since establishment-specific characteristics were una-
vailable. However, even with establishment-level data, analyses have
1 A recent article by Frenken et al. (2011) provides a good survey on clusters and
their effects on industrial dynamics.
2 Glaeser et al. (1992) refer to these dynamic localization effects as Marshall-Arrow-
Romer (MAR) externalities.
3 Krugman (1991), page 485.
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technology uncertainty, and internal sources of decreasing long run av-
erage costs (Audretsch andMahmood, 1994). The role of internal econ-
omies of scale and their effect on firm profitability and exit probabilities
have been primarily investigated within the context of the cost disad-
vantage inherent in operation at less than minimum efficient scale
(see, for example, Audretsch, 2002). We are aware of a small number
of studies that look at industrial localization as a variable for explaining
firm exits (Staber, 2001; Folta et al., 2006; Shaver and Flyer, 2000).
However, the present study differs significantly in its use of exact and
continuous measures of the geographic distribution of establishments.
2. Literature review
The literature on firm survival has largely ignored agglomeration
effects. Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) use plant-level panel data from
the Census of Manufactures to analyze entry and exit from 4-digit
SIC industries at the single plant and multi-plant firm levels between
the five year intervals of the Census. While they include concentra-
tion of ownership by way of multi-plant operation, their model does
not include any measure of spatial concentration of the given indus-
try within the specific market regions. In a similar vein, Baldwin and
Gorecki (1991) analyze entry and exit with particular attention to
the effects of firm characteristics at time of entry on prospects for sur-
vival. Others have investigated exit rates relative to size, scale, organi-
zational structure (Audretsch, 1991), technology (Winter, 1984),
market growth (Bradburd and Caves, 1982) and pre-entry experience
(see, Helfat and Lieberman (2002) for a review). Audretsch and
Mahmood (1994, 1995) estimate hazard functions using firm-
specific data, but their treatment of scale economies focuses on internal
factors while recognition of the technological environment is limited to
higher costs due to higher levels of R&D or greater technological uncer-
tainty inmore technologically advanced and dynamic industries. Dunne
et al. (2005) are primarily interested in the role of producer experience
in firm survival.
The few studies that have looked at spatial concentration and firm
failure rates have concluded that higher concentration is associated
with higher mortality (Folta et al., 2006; Shaver and Flyer, 2000;
Staber, 2001). As Shaver and Flyer (2000) point out, if establishments
are heterogeneous, knowledge spillovers will likely benefit weaker
establishments more than stronger establishments. If weaker estab-
lishments' competitiveness is bolstered by spatial proximity to stron-
ger establishments, particularly strong establishments may perceive
that they have more to lose than to gain by close proximity to com-
petitors. The implication is that spatial concentrations may tend to at-
tract weaker establishments and repel entrants that have stronger
intellectual properties to commercialize. Although Folta et al. (2006)
advise caution in the use of survival as a single measure of firm per-
formance within industry concentrations, they suggest that the
higher mortality rates for firms in denser concentrations may be
due to higher performance expectations and lower exit costs. They
also point out, as does Henderson et al. (1995), that net agglomeration
economies may be non-linear. In the early growth phase of an industry
cluster, positive agglomeration economies dominate. However, conges-
tion effects become relatively more important as the concentration
grows and matures.
The role of agglomeration economies has been carefully investi-
gated in the context of firm entry and growth. Rosenthal and
Strange (2003) find that localization helps to explain entry patterns.
Of rather more interest has been research into the effect of agglomer-
ation economies on local or regional employment growth rates at the
industrial level, seeking to determine whether localization or urbani-
zation effects, or both, are present [Glaeser et al. (1992), Henderson et
al. (1995), Combes (2000)]. More recently, researchers have consid-
ered effects at the firm level. Henderson (2003) finds that greater lo-
calized firm counts in the high tech industries has significantproductivity effects at the firm level. Fafchamps (2004), looking at
manufacturing firms in Morocco, concludes that agglomeration has
an effect on firm growth rates, but it is not working through produc-
tivity. 1
Combes (2000) notes that localized information spillovers occur
when firms have complementary pieces of information that are ex-
changed through localized relationships. The greater the number of
firms, the greater the likelihood that complementarities occur. He de-
scribes these pieces of information as relating to firm or market orga-
nization and input or output innovations, the latter being referred to
as a technological externality. One might think that innovations in
any of these realms might suffice to inspire an entrepreneur and re-
sult in a start-up. Henderson et al. (1995) envision the magnitude of
localized knowledge externalities at any given time as the result of
a dynamic process, the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externality.
That is, a shared, localized knowledge base accumulates through
time as collective learning and growth of experience takes place. 2
This dynamic element would presumably also characterize the extent
of knowledge and experience of individual firms.
If important knowledge spillovers are present, one can then easily
imagine why start-up firms would choose to locate among kindred
firms. By definition, new firms lack experience. Thus, if the relevant
spillovers are, as Henderson et al. (1995) suggest, a non-excludable
knowledge base (technical and market “know-how” that accrues
through time) that is shared by all localized firms, the entering firm
could expect to be up to speed quicker by embedding itself in an
existing concentration. New firms' contributions to the knowledge
base would occur as the firms gain unique, substantive experience
and so acquire, or enable others to acquire, unique bits of knowledge
that circulate within the locality. The key observation for us is that
new firms would apparently have much more to gain by entering into
a spatially concentrated environment than incumbent firms gain from
their entry. Indeed, if entry into the locality sharpens competition for
inputs and the extension of shared knowledge in an increasingly
competitive environment has the effect of accelerating the pace of
innovation, rates of return to R&D will fall, as pointed out by Combes
(2000). The marginal effect of rival firm density may be negative. On
the other hand, each potential start-up would have to balance the ben-
efits from gaining access to the knowledge spillovers with the costs of
the leakage of its own intellectual property, or, more generally, its
R&D, due to its imperfect excludability. In the absence of any entry bar-
riers, entry would occur up to the point where risk-adjusted expected
profits would be equalized across localities. Higher expected profits
that accrue to economies of scale available from location in a denser
concentration would have to be balanced by greater risk.
Moreover, given the relatively greater riskiness of new firms com-
pared to more mature firms, co-location with similar firms may en-
hance the new firms' ability to attract employees. This would be the
case if, for example, workers consider the higher risk of failure associ-
ated with employment in a new firm to be mitigated by virtue of its
location within a spatial concentration of similar firms. That is, if
workers believe that localized social and professional networking in-
creases their labor mobility, they would prefer, all else equal, to work
for a firm within an industry concentration. Indeed, Freeedman
(2008) finds greater spatial concentration in the software publishing
industry results in greater mobility of labor.
Krugman (1991) poses the question, “how far does a technological
spillover spill?”3 Most of the earlier studies of knowledge externali-
ties were conducted at relatively aggregated industry levels and
over relatively large geographic areas. Mansfield (1995), among
5 The distances were computed under the assumption the world is flat, using trigo-
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas have been common geographical
boundaries for analysis. Henderson (2003) concludes that plants in
clusters located in different counties within the same MSA do not
benefit from clusters beyond their own, other than from access to
shared sources of production inputs. Using finer spatial focus,
Wallsten (2001) finds that knowledge spillovers are limited to a radius
on the order of 1/10 of a mile (or about two city blocks). This suggests
that the effective locality is a neighborhood, not even a city, and certain-
ly significantly smaller than counties and MSAs. Saxenian (1994) pro-
vides a relevant quote from a technology industry employee in Silicon
Valley who said, “The joke is that you can change jobs and not change
parking lots.” Rosenthal and Strange (2003), looking at start-up firms
at the Zip Code level, conclude that agglomeration economies attenuate
rapidly up to a distance of 1 mile.
Complicating the matter further is the relevance of time. Jaffe et al.
(1993) find a temporal component to the localization of knowledge.
In high tech industries, the rate of product innovation and market
evolution is extraordinarily rapid. If important elements of localized
knowledge have a brief shelf life and knowledge diffuses slowly
through space, there is a premium on close proximity since its even-
tual diffusion beyond the locality is largely irrelevant.
If own-industry knowledge spillovers dissipate very rapidly across
space, the search for localization externalities needs to be conducted
within a finely grained geographical focus. Significant localization ef-
fects may not reach a threshold for detection if the spatial unit under
observation is the MSA while the appropriate geographical area is
sub-metropolitan in size. Measures of urban specialization across
the larger geography will understate the actual and relevant industri-
al density and perhaps overstate the role of industrial diversity. Em-
ployment location quotients as a specialization measure, for example,
tend toward 1 as the geographic extent of the measurement region is
expanded. This has clear implications for observational distinctions be-
tween MAR and Jacobs-type externalities. 4
In the analysis that follows, we analyze the effect of agglomeration
economies on high-tech establishment survival. We do not have an a
priori hypothesis of the effects of industrial density on survival.
Combes (2000) notes, “Since competition generates opposite effects
on the level of local R&D and innovations, its effect is also indeterminate
on local technological spillovers.” Using variation in establishment-
specific measures of spatial density, within circles of varying radii, we
seek to analyze the effect of localization on high tech establishmenthaz-
ard rates.
3. Empirical model and data
The high-technology industries considered in this paper have
come to represent the new “knowledge economy.” These industries
are ideal candidates to benefit from the presence of specialized,
high skill labor inputs and knowledge spillovers. Indeed, the impor-
tance of well educated and creative workers in this highly dynamic
sector is one of its salient features.
We adapt the model found in Rosenthal and Strange (2003) to the
question of establishment survival. That is, if prices are normalized to
1, profit-maximizing firm j's profits in industry i in period t can be
expressed as
πjit x; Þ ¼ maxz a xjit
 
f zð Þ 1þ ijÞ−c zð Þ

ð1Þ
where a(x) is a shift term that depends on a vector x=(xl,xu,xj) con-
sisting of both localization and urbanization variables as well as other
characteristics that are particular to firm j. The vector xl contains lo-
calization effects as captured by firm density measures, as explained4 See Jacobs (1969).below. Both the production (revenue) technology f(z) and the cost
function c(z) depend on a vector of factor inputs z. Production tech-
nology is common to all firms in the industry. A firm will remain ac-
tive in the market as long as long as πjit>=0 and will exit if πjitb0,
assuming that current period profits will persist. We assume ijt is a
random draw for each firm in a given industry in each period and is
independent and identically distributed across firms in each industry
according to the cumulative distribution function H(i) .









There is then a probability h(t)=H(jt) that a firm will exit the in-
dustry in any given period t. If agglomeration economies vary posi-
tively with spatial density, i.e., greater density results in a higher
value of a(x), greater spatial density will correspond to a lower
value of H(j), all else equal. Therefore, the probability is higher that
the firm will survive the period.
Although the discussion thus far has been cast in terms of the firm,
our analysis, more precisely, takes place at the establishment level.
We estimate probabilities of establishment failure using a Cox pro-
portional hazards model. The basic Cox proportional hazards model
can be written as follows:
h tð Þ ¼ h0 tð Þexp x′β þ z′ψ
 
ð3Þ
where h(t) is the conditional hazard rate and h0(t) is the unspecified
baseline hazard function. The vectors of covariates that are establish-
ment specific are denoted by x and the market condition variables are
denoted by z.
In order to gauge the geographic extent of localization effects, we
use an approach similar to Rosenthal and Strange (2003). However,
using an establishment-level dataset, we compute alternative spatial
density measures within concentric rings of 0–1, 1–5, 5–10, and
10–25 mile radii around each establishment's exact location for
every high-tech establishment in Texas during the period of the
study. Unlike Rosenthal and Strange (2003), the density measures
are based on the actual physical addresses of establishments and em-
ployment. After geo-coding each establishment by physical address,
we compute the distance between each establishment and all other es-
tablishments both in the same industry and in all other industries. 5
Therefore, as Duranton and Overman (2005) point out, space is treated
as continuous so that the measures of the distribution of activity are in-
dependent of any city, county or other arbitrary jurisdictional division.
We limit our analysis to a maximum radius of 25 miles since that cor-
responds roughly to the typical Texas county. In Texas, nearly all
counties are square and half of the diagonal distance within a county
is an average of about 23 miles. Since the geographic areas over which
these measures are computed are identical for all establishments, no
additional spatial normalization is necessary. Freeedman (2008) using
a data set similar to ours, calculated the location quotient for each estab-
lishment within concentric circles with radii of 5, 10, and 25miles
around each establishment.
We compute local densities using both (employment) location
quotients (LQ) and count data in terms of establishments. The con-
ventional LQ is a measure of an industry's presence in a particular lo-
cation compared to the general spatial distribution of economic
activity. For a given industry, the LQ is calculated as the ratio of its
share of total employment in a sub-region relative to that industry'snometric functions with latitude and longitude as arguments. The distances are typi-
cally small enough that curvature of the earth introduces relatively small errors.
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pute the LQ for each ring around each establishment relative to the
State of Texas. An establishment and its employment are excluded
from density measures in any ring in which the establishment is lo-
cated. Therefore, all measures of the own-industry LQ are referred
to as rivals' LQ, where the use of the term rival, in most cases, signifies
rivalry in competition for localized resources. In some cases, the local-
ized firms will also be rivals in output markets.







Where, Erji is the number of employees around establishment j in
industry i (by six digit NAICS codes) and Erj is the total number of
employees in all industries around establishment j within radius r
for rlb r≤ ru. The values rl and ru are the lower and upper values of
the radii defining the four concentric rings defined above. Ei is the
total number of employees in Texas for industry i and E is the total
employment for all non-farm industries in Texas.
We obtained the establishment-level data for Texas from the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the
Texas Workforce Commission. This data set provides establishment-
specific monthly employment and quarterly total wages reported by
establishment as required under the Texas unemployment insurance
(UI) program. Each record includes the specific location (address) of
the establishment, business start-up date (the date on which UI liabil-
ity begins), and the relevant six-digit NAICS code. Note that a firm
could have many establishments (branches or franchises) and they
are identified and reported in separate records. This panel data set
is comprised of observations from Q3:1999 through Q2:2007.6 As in
Dunne et al. (1989), we define an establishment exit as the last period
where we observe a UI account number in the data set. In the case of a
single-establishment firm, this would also imply disappearance of the
EIN (Enterprise Identification Number). For multi-establishment
firms, if at least one establishment survives, so does the EIN.
Definition of the high-technology sector is necessarily somewhat
arbitrary. This paper utilizes the set of high tech industries specified
by the American Electronics Association (now known as TechAmer-
ica) in 2003 –roughly the mid-point of the timeframe for this
study– and based on the 2002 NAICS scheme. It includes 49 industries
identified at the NAICS-6 level. The American Electronics Association's
principle selection criterion is that an industry be a “maker/creator of
technology, whether it be in the form of products, communications,
or services.” See Table A1 for a list of industries that constitute the
high tech sector in this analysis. In our data set, we have more than
20,000 technology firms (more than 25,000 establishments) and
380,000 total observations. From these, we identify separately the en-
trants with previous experience.7 Fig. 1 illustrates the location of
high-tech establishments in Texas and shows their spatial concentra-
tion along Interstate 35 from the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex down
to San Antonio and in the Houston metropolitan area. One can also
note a sprinkling of high-tech establishments across the less urban
areas of the state. Fig. 2 illustrates the intra-urban spatial distribution
of software publishing establishments in the Austin Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area. Spatial clustering at this level is also evident.
In the case of the high tech industries, transportation costs as an
agglomerating force and access to geographically specific natural re-
sources are not particularly relevant. High-tech establishments are
not typically tied to local or regional market demand and do not6 It should be pointed out that the authors obtained these data under an agreement
of confidentiality and disclosure of the actual data is subject to certain restrictions.
7 Entrant with previous experience is a firm that enters the market but has previous-
ly been in the industry under prior ownership.have significant upstream industrial linkages other than, perhaps, re-
search universities, expert consultants, and specialized funding
sources. Of these upstream linkages, we control for the level and
proximity of university research by including a dummy variable for
the local presence of a research university or institution. Local pres-
ence is defined as being in the same county as the establishment. A
research university or institution is identified as one which has re-
ceived at least $10 million in federal research support during any fed-
eral fiscal year during the period of this analysis. Using this criterion,
there are ten counties in Texas which qualify as hosting a research
complex. Data on annual university R&D expenditures were obtained
from the National Science Foundation. The annual NSF data actually
span two calendar years since the federal fiscal year begins in October.
In order to convert these annual R&D expenditures into quarterly data,
we use a fourth of a fiscal year's total for quarters 1–3, and a fourth of
the following fiscal year's total for quarter 4 of each calendar year.
In order to measure the urbanization effect, we compute urban
density for all non-farm industries, excluding the industry in which
the establishment under observation is located, using analogous mea-
sures as were used for localization effects. However, in this case, we
only compute density measures for the number of establishments
and employment for the entire area within a 25 mile radius. We com-
pute these measures as both LQ's and count data. We also compute a
Herfindahl Index to capture the industrial diversity in the 25 mile cir-
cle. The Herfindahl Index is the sum of squared employment shares at
the 4-digit NAICS. We include this measure to capture the possibility
that urban industrial diversity generates external effects (Jacobs-
type) that are relevant to establishment survival probabilities. A pos-
itive coefficient on this variable can be interpreted to mean that less
industrial diversity (higher HHI) tends to generate higher mortality.
In that case, establishments in regionally specialized areas would
have higher mortality rates, ceteris paribus, than establishments locat-
ed in industrially diverse urban areas.
In addition to the localization and urbanization effects, the set of
establishment-specific variables also includes age of the establishment
in months, average payroll, and relative size of the establishment. Re-
gional measures include the county unemployment rate, proportion
of county population between 24 and 54 years, and rural land price.
Age of the establishment in months is the period of time since UI
liability began. This is reported for all establishments. Therefore, de-
spite the fact that the data set starts in 1999, we can observe the ac-
tual start-up date for all establishments. Average payroll is the
establishment's total payroll for the quarter divided by average
monthly employment for the quarter. This method for approximating
wage rates is fairly common in the labor economics literature
(Freeedman, 2008; De Silva et al., 2010; Dube et al., 2007, 2010). Rel-
ative size of the establishment is the ratio of its current employment
to its industry's average establishment employment in the state.
The proportion of the county population between 24 and 54 years
old is taken from the Census Bureau's Annual Population Estimates.
This variable serves as a proxy for the technological savvy of the
workforce and assumes younger workers are more comfortable
with rapidly evolving technologies. While educational characteristics
would be preferable, they are not available for a majority of Texas
counties. To account for factor costs, we use the yearly median rural
land price in each of 33 land market regions in Texas for the counties
comprising the region as reported by the Texas A&M Real Estate Cen-
ter. As a second measure, we use the average quarterly payroll for the
individual establishment. The county unemployment rate for the final
month in each quarter, as reported by the Texas Workforce Commis-
sion, is also included to provide an indication of the overall economic
conditions in the local county.88 The TWC unemployment rate is the average rate for the calendar year. We average
consecutive years beginning with year 1999–2000 since that best overlaps our defini-
tion of a year as running from third quarter through second quarter of the following
calendar year.
Fig. 1. High-tech establishments locations in Texas.
Fig. 2. Spatial distribution of establishments for software publishers in Austin MSA.
9 In regressions we do not consider self-employed workers (firms).
10 We use the Breslow–Peto approximation to break ties.
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market conditions by including the prime rate, it seems unlikely
that high tech firms rely in critical ways on bank financing
(Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). The key measure of access to finan-
cial resources should capture conditions in either venture capital or
public equity markets. We attempt to capture these influences by in-
cluding the NASDAQ index at the previous quarterly close. The
NASDAQ has been more closely associated with the technology sector
than other stock exchanges. We assume that a rising index reflects
greater market willingness to provide equity funding.
Since some establishments are part of multi-establishment firms,
establishment-level observations for each industry are not likely tobe independent over time. Note, the sample consists of 25,279 estab-
lishments with 389,343 observations that capture current quarterly
establishment characteristics until they fail or are right censored.
Therefore, we use clustered standard errors by firm.9 We assume
that the error term is independent across firms but not necessarily
within a firm over time.10 Establishments that are part of a multi-
establishment firm may have different mortality rates, all else equal,








Establishment with prior experience .322
(.467)
Current quarterly average wage rate 15,925.56
(13,033.78)
Average age in months 112.811
(144.78)
Number of branches 15.477
(64.918)
Relative establishment size 1.17545
(5.5537)
Employment based HHI: 25 ≤miles (4 digit NAICS) .396
(.206)
County unemployment rate 5.4986
(1.225)
Average total population in counties between ages 24 and 54 66,1356.10
(51,5557.50)
Other establishment density: 25 ≤miles 50,929.45
(32,642.30)
County amenity LQ .963
(.221)




Probability of being located in an MSA county .972
(.166)
Probability of being located in an knowledge center county .713
(.452)
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ber (EIN) in Texas to control for this influence. While it would be
ideal to control for all multi-establishment operations, which would
identify association with firms that have other establishments outside
of Texas, we are unable to do so since our dataset is restricted to Texas
establishments.
4. Results and discussion
Table 1 contains averages for both localized density measures at
the NAICS-6. The second column reports the average LQ based on
the employment of rival establishments as calculated for each radius
band (donut). The third column reports the density measures based
on number of rivals. Not surprisingly, the LQ measure is quite high
for the 1 mile rings since the average establishment is located in a
one-mile concentration with nearly a dozen rivals. The presence of
any rivals in an employment area as small as 1 mile in radius reflects
substantial localization relative to the State of Texas. It is worthwhile
to point out the tight geographic distribution of activity that is dis-
cerned with continuous spatial measures and which would not be ob-
served at the county or MSA-level. Note the pattern that is observed
in both columns as distance increases; the densities first decrease
and then tick up across the 5–10 and 10–25 mile rings. This would
be consistent with an urban spatial pattern of discrete sets of com-
mercial buildings distributed across a metropolitan region. Table 2 re-
ports the summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
Table 3 contains the results of the proportional hazard estimations
using rivals' LQ and rival establishment count density measures. Col-
umn 1 reports results for the LQ estimation without any other estab-
lishment or county controls. This is intended as a simple test of our
hypothesis that localization affects establishment survival. Column 3
reports the results for the estimations using establishment count as
the density measures. The log number of rivals is based on the total
number of rival establishments in the ring plus 1. In this way, the
measure is always defined and is zero for a ring in which no rivals
are present.Table 1
Agglomeration measures by radius.
Radius For all TX establishments




>1–5 ≤miles .209 .717
(4.829) (2.681)
>5–10 ≤miles .229 1.317
(5.684) (4.627)
>10–25 ≤miles .482 5.868
(6.458) (14.673)
For all MSA establishments
1≤mile 63.861 11.948
(1371.518) (47.128)
>1–5 ≤miles .209 .734
(4.869) (2.713)
>5–10 ≤miles .225 1.350
(5.614) (4.685)
>10–25 ≤miles .485 6.015
(6.450) (14.818)
For all non-MSA establishments
1 ≤mile 257.652 1.639
(1939.547) (5.444)
>1–5 ≤miles .181 .123
(3.201) (.980)
>5–10 ≤miles .360 .179
(7.722) (1.272)
>10–25 ≤miles .376 .844
(6.740) (6.556)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.Estimation results based on the different measures of intra-
industry establishment densities do not differ in substantive ways.
Both measures produce coefficient estimates that are positive and
highly significant for the radius up to 1 mile. The signs on the coeffi-
cients for both intra-industry density measures become both negative
and significant as the rings become more distant. There is an impor-
tant difference in interpretation of the different density measures.
Since the LQ captures employment density within the industry, it
can be quite high even though the ring may contain only one or two
other establishments. In fact, for the small area within a 1 mile radius,
the LQ will typically be well above 1 if there is at least one other
firm.11 Moreover, an establishment located adjacent to a large estab-
lishment might appear to be in a dense one-mile concentration even
though there is, in fact, only one or two other establishments in the
locale. This measure effectively aggregates the rival establishments'
employment, making no distinction in terms of the number of estab-
lishments. On the other hand, the count density measure does not
capture rival firm size, only their number. While our preference
leans toward the count density measure, using both measures provides
different perspectives that yield a consistent conclusion.
The positive and significant coefficients on both of the intra-
industry density measures for the area within a radius of 1 mile
imply that greater concentration over a relatively short distance is as-
sociated with higher failure rates, not lower. The effect, however, ap-
pears not to extend beyond 1 mile. This result is similar to the results
of Shaver and Flyer (2000) and Folta et al. (2006). It is inconsistent
with the assumption that greater concentration results in net positive
localization economies for these industries. This is suggestive of more
vigorous competition among establishments (both in product space11 As noted, the LQmeasure within one-mile rings in cases of dense concentrations of
establishments (own-industry) tends to be quite high. The range of the measured LQ's
is from zero to over 50,000. As a consequence, the estimated coefficient is quite small,
although significant at .01.
Table 3
Hazard estimates for high-tech firms in Texas (all firms).
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Startups .655*** .516*** .730*** .718*** .723***















































































NASDAQ (Log) −.170* −.255** −.258**
(.089) (.082) (.082)






Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
establishments
24,625 24,625 24,625 24,625 24,625
Number of failures 2434 2434 2434 2434 2434
Wald χ2 29,689.352 30,003.631 2338.370 2376.560 35,464.165
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical significance at
the 5% level, and * statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors
clustered by firms are in parentheses.
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and Strange found in the case of the effects of density on entry, atten-
uates quite rapidly. Establishments that are located somewhat farther
apart – further than 1 mile – enjoy the benefits of the agglomeration
without the competitive effects. While suggestive, however, it pro-
vides no direct evidence that knowledge externalities are present
and negative.
The estimates of the coefficients of the variables from the LQ and
count density regressions are qualitatively nearly identical. Establish-
ments with higher employment shares (larger establishments) with-
in 25 miles have a higher rate of survival. Establishments with priorexperience (or establishments that changed hands) have relatively
lower hazard rates. This observation is in line with Dunne et al.
(2005). Results indicate that relatively ‘older’ establishments have a
lower hazard rate. Workforce characteristics are significant with
expected signs. The positive and significant coefficient estimate for
the log number of branches within each EIN is of some interest.
While one might postulate a number of reasons for this finding, we
find plausible, as did Folta et al. (2006) in their firm-level analysis,
the possibility that establishment exit costs are lower for high tech
firms whose establishments tend to be located within spatial concen-
trations. For many of these industries, establishment fixed costs are
low, intra-firm reallocations across establishments may be readily ac-
complished, and terminated employees may have relatively shorter
intervals between jobs. Another interesting conjecture is that high
tech firms, particularly those that have lower entry and exit costs, lo-
cate branches within different spatial concentrations in order to take
advantage of diverse pools of localized knowledge. As the firms learn
the value of localization in the different clusters, they reallocate re-
sources accordingly by closing and perhaps expanding some estab-
lishments. At the very least, closing establishments within a multi-
establishment firm has quite different implications than closing an
establishment when that implies mortality of the firm itself.
The coefficient on the urban density variable is not statistically
significant. As one might easily imagine, greater urban density
brings both benefits and costs. While providing greater diversity
and specialization of inputs, greater urban density means greater
congestion costs and higher factor costs as real estate prices and
commercial lease rates are bid up. From experience, the authors
of this paper know that commuting times during rush hour in Aus-
tin, TX were extraordinary during the decade of the 1990s and into
the new century as the city's transportation infrastructure strug-
gled to catch up to regional growth driven by the high tech sector.
Industrial diversity, as measured by the HHI, appears weakly to in-
fluence mortality rates of high tech firms in Texas. Thus, it can be
inferred that net total urbanization forces have a slight influence
on establishment survival. In industries where high levels of
human capital are key, the negative coefficient on average quarter-
ly wages could be explained by the fact that Texas establishments
that pay higher wages are able to retain more talented workers
and enjoy higher levels of performance. Since the QCEW data
base only reports the number of employees for whom unemploy-
ment insurance is paid and total payroll, another possibility is
that the average payroll increases due to additional hours worked
for a given number of insured employees when business is good.
The sign on the lagged NASDAQ variable is negative and quite sig-
nificant in the count density estimations. As a bellwether of technol-
ogy firms' ability to raise capital, a rising NASDAQ index is consistent
with higher survival rates. The high tech sector has been character-
ized by high levels of establishment start-ups that relied on venture
capital inputs for initial growth phases and public equity offerings
(IPO) to establish longer term viability. Finally, university R&D expen-
ditures appear to have no effect on hazard rates, echoing the results of
De Silva and McComb (2012).
There may be selection issues in the above estimations. Higher
failure rates would be observed if a disproportionate share of the lo-
calized establishments are weak relative to the universe of establish-
ments in the industry and more likely to fail for reasons otherwise
unrelated to spatial density. This problem would be exacerbated if
existing clusters attract more entry, and entrants, as new establish-
ments, are more likely to fail. To avoid this problem, we focus only
on establishments that had been in operation for at least 36 months
prior to the beginning of the period under analysis. In this sample,
we exclude any establishment that entered during the period from
Q3:1997 through Q2:2000. These “established” establishments,
which we term “incumbent establishments,” have demonstrated
some degree of sustained ability to compete within the industry. By
Table 5
Hazard estimates for high-tech firms in Texas after 2002:Q4.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Startups .910*** .393*** .866*** .387*** .402***









































Establishment controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Market controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
establishments
17,748 17,748 17,748 17,748 17,748
Number of failures 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936
Wald χ2 82,725.992 1913.096 2226.378 3067.023 73,894.678
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical significance at
the 5% level, and * statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors
clustered by establishments are in parentheses.
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view that the question of selection bias is mitigated.
Table 4 reports results from both the LQ and count density estima-
tions for “incumbent establishments” only. It can be seen that qualita-
tive results for localization effects do not change. The estimated
coefficients for density within 1 mile, for both density measures, are
positive and statistically significant. The estimates, where significant,
change sign as distance increases beyond the immediate ring. As
would be expected, the relative size of the establishment has a nega-
tive and significant relationship with mortality rates as reported in
columns 2 and 4 of Table 6. We also examined these exit probabilities
using simple probit regressions and found, once again, that qualita-
tive results are unchanged. We do not report these estimates, but
they can be provided upon request.
We report hazard rates for “entrant establishments” in Table 5
where “entrant establishments” denotes establishments that entered
between Q3:2000 and Q2:2004. This allows us to track entrants for at
least three years. More importantly, we are able to observe density
measures in the cluster at the time the establishment enters the in-
dustry. The results on initial density measures, in our view, are
consistent with the Rosenthal and Strange (2003) finding that locali-
zation economies have a positive influence on entrants' location deci-
sions, although the effect diminishes rapidly over space. It would
appear, as we reasoned above, that density offers new establishments
initial opportunities for greater profits but bears higher longer-term
risk, particularly as the degree of spatial concentration increases.
Thus, one can theorize that positive marginal benefits to entrants
from localization generate negative marginal benefits to the existing
concentration in the form of increased competition for resources
and output markets. Greater density in the more distant rings againTable 4
Hazard estimates for high-tech firms in Texas that entered before July 1997.
















































No Yes No Yes Yes
Market controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
establishments
9117 9117 9117 9117 9117
Number of failures 718 718 718 718 718
Wald χ2 137,187.93 96,632.26 163,343.93 135,720.54 153,641.65
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** denotes statistical significance at
the 5% level, and * statistical significance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors
clustered by firms are in parentheses.appears to reduce hazard rates. We also examine the exit probabilities
using simple probit regressions and find that the qualitative results
are the same. These results can be provided upon request.
The high tech sector experienced a significant contraction during
the period 2000–2002 following the bursting of the “dot.com” bubble
in March 2000. Although we control for market conditions by includ-
ing the NASDAQ variable, anecdotal evidence suggests that the latter
part of the decade of the 1990s was characterized by relatively abun-
dant venture capital and the ability of unprofitable Internet-related
firms, in particular, to locate external sources of financing. As Fig. 3
Panel A1and A2 illustrate, while the number of high tech establish-
ments and firms declined sharply during the period 2000–2002 both
in terms of net births/deaths, this decline also resulted in a thinning of
the spatial concentration of the high tech industries in Texas. This is
seen by the sharp decrease in the average numbers of establishments
in the same industry within rings proximate to each establishment.
This is consistent with our finding that mortality rates are higher in
denser concentrations. However, by the start of 2003, the total number
of establishments and the level of spatial concentration within the in-
dustries appear to have stabilized, as can be seen in Fig. 3 Panels
B1and B2.
This contractionary period undoubtedly reduced heterogeneity
among establishments within industries as weaker establishments
were weeded out and provides some additional opportunity to con-
trol for unobserved establishment heterogeneities. We re-estimate
the model using only post-2002 observations on establishments
that survived the shakeout, i.e., establishments that were still in oper-
ation in the first quarter of 2003. The results of this estimation are
contained in Table 5. As can be seen, the qualitative result on the pos-
itive association of higher mortality with greater density within
1 mile still holds for the count density variables. The effect of the LQ
on mortalilty variable vanishes. This may be attributable to a post-
Fig. 3. High tech firm densities and net gains by radius.
12 Glaeser et al. (1992) found little evidence of MAR-type externalities across a
broader range of industries.
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variation in the LQ measures.
5. Conclusions
The results of this analysis, although consistent with Folta et al
(2006), Shaver and Flyer (2000), and Staber (2001), run contrary to
conventional beliefs of economists on the net effects of localization
economies. This study makes an important contribution in this realm
by virtue of the relatively greater geographic and establishment-level
detail that is employed. Indeed, the narrow spatial analysis is important.
The negative localization effect on establishment survival is confined to
a radius of only 1 mile or less. This “close quarters” effect would be ob-
scured in an analysis at the MSA or county level.
We find these results on localization to be quite plausible and sug-
gestive of the presence of highly localized externalities that have the
effect of enhancing competition among the very closely-located es-
tablishments. However, we recognise that our model cannot empiri-
cally identify the separate effects of localization. We realize, as do
Shaver and Flyer (2000), that knowledge spillovers spill both ways.
It is quite possible that establishments with relatively strong intellec-
tual property or higher levels of R&D might perceive that there is
more to lose than to gain by a location next door to their rivals or po-
tential rivals or that the availability of knowledge spillovers would
tend to attract weaker establishments. We control for this possibility
by estimating the model using only observations on establishments
that had been in operation for at least three years.
Marginal proximity (between 1 and 25 miles) to the densest in-
dustry concentration appears to offer positive net localization econo-
mies. As industry density beyond the 1 mile radius increases, the
effect of density on mortality changes sign. Location near, but not
in, a dense spatial concentration might offer key advantages whilemitigating continuous knowledge outflows associated with continu-
ous inter-establishment worker interactions that occur in close quar-
ters. The potential labor draw probably extends to at least 25 miles in
even the most congested metropolitan areas while the nearby indus-
try concentration ensures access to networks of specialized venture
capitalists and other specialized business services providers. Access
to these key production inputs is not likely affected significantly by
locating just “off to the side.” This may offer an explanation for why
Glaeser et al. (1992), in their analysis of industry growth at the
MSA-level, found no evidence of MAR-type dynamic localization ex-
ternalities in the high-tech industries at the MSA-level. 12
Despite negative net localization economies, start-up establish-
ments may nevertheless be attracted to denser concentrations.
Ready access to the localized knowledge base may provide critical in-
formation for an inexperienced firm to survive the period following
its launch. Newer establishments are riskier than incumbent estab-
lishments and are probably less attractive, ceteris paribus, to potential
employees due to their higher likelihood of establishment mortality.
Employment in a dense concentration can help to offset employee
risk. That is, if geographic proximity increases worker mobility, as
Freeedman (2008) finds, individuals may be more willing to take a
job with a new enterprise if the hiring establishment is embedded
in a dense concentration. Co-location of similar establishments in
the same office tower or campus facilitates inter-establishment em-
ployee networking through frequent casual encounters, lunches at
the same restaurants, etc. Workers are able to acquire current em-
ployment market information through this localized network at rela-
tively low cost and use existing personal relationships to advantage in
Table A1 (continued)
NAICS Description NAICS Description
334418 Printed Circuit Assembly 541519 Other Computer Related
Services
334419 Other Electronic Components 541710 R & D in the Physical,
Engineering, & Life
Sciences
334510 Electromedical & Electrotherapeutic
Apparatus
541711 Commercial Physical &
Biological Research
334511 Search, Detection, Navigation,
Guidance, Aeronautical, & Nautical
Systems & Instruments
611420 Computer Training
700 D.G. De Silva, R.P. McComb / Regional Science and Urban Economics 42 (2012) 691–701competition for employment openings. Thus, the same elements
that contribute to knowledge spillovers between establishments
can benefit riskier establishments in terms of their employment of
workers.
This finding may provide some support for the argument that
higher rates of entry are the other side of the coin from higher mortal-
ity rates. Carlton (1983) noted that firm failures provide localized in-
gredients for start-ups by releasing factors of production, most
notably labor and entrepreneurial proclivities. This is consistent
with the view that there is an internally dynamic process at work in
which higher failure rates contribute to higher start up rates in highly
localized and dense industry concentrations.
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Appendix ATable A1
High-tech industry classifications.
NAICS Description NAICS Description




325412 Pharmaceutical Preparations 334513 Industrial Process
Control Instruments
325413 In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic
Substances
334514 Totalizing Fluid Meter &
Counting Devices
325414 Biological Products, Except
Diagnostic Substances
334515 Electricity Measuring &
Testing Equipment
333295 Semiconductor Machinery 334516 Analytical Laboratory
Instruments
333314 Optical Instrument & Lens 334517 Irradiation Apparatus
333315 Photographic & Photocopying
Equipment
334519 Other Measuring &
Controlling Instruments
334111 Electronic Computers 335921 Fiber Optic Cables
334112 Computer Storage Devices 511210 Software Publishers
334113 Computer Terminals 517110 Wired
Telecommunications
Carriers
334119 Other Computer Peripheral
Equipment &
517211 Paging Services
Electromedical Equipment 517212 Cellular & Other
Wireless
Telecommunications
334210 Telephone Apparatus 517310 Telecommunications
Resellers




Equipment 517510 Cable & Other Program
Distribution
334290 Other Communications Equipment 517910 Other
Telecommunications
334310 Audio & Video Equipment 518111 Internet Service
Providers
334411 Electron Tubes 518112 Web Search Portals
334412 Bare Printed Circuit Boards 518210 Data Processing,
Hosting, & Related
Services
334414 Electronic Capacitors 541330 Engineering Services
334413 Semiconductor & Related Devices 541380 Testing Laboratories
334415 Electronic Resistors 541511 Custom Computer
Programming




334417 Electronic Connectors 541513 Computer Facilities
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